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1 Introduction
Forty years ago, in the context of a world survey on access to justice, Cappelletti 
and Garth sounded the following warning: “The greatest danger ... is the risk that 
streamlined, efficient procedures will abandon the fundamental guarantees of civil 
procedure – essentially, those of an impartial adjudicator and of the parties’ right to 
be heard.”1
In the authors’ view, this warning has special relevance in modern-day common-
law systems with the ever-increasing demand for cheaper, more efficient and 
speedier procedures for the resolution of civil disputes.
The last three decades have indeed seen dramatic changes to the civil justice 
systems in different common law countries. An important stimulus for the 
transformation of the traditional common law adjudication process in these 
countries was Lord Woolf’s report entitled Access to Justice: Final Report to the 
Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1996) and its 
implementation in the Civil Procedure Rules of 1999.2 The Woolf reforms introduced 
new goals for civil procedure in England and Wales to address the perceived ills of 
cost, delay and complexity. Essentially, these goals included the achievement of 
justice through efficiency, speediness, cost-saving and proportionality.3 The main 
mechanisms introduced by the Woolf reforms to further the new goals were judicial 
case management and alternative dispute resolution, especially mediation, aimed at 
settlement of cases.4
A strict exercise of case management powers by judges and an embrace of 
alternative dispute resolution at the cost of trial adjudication may have an adverse 
impact on two fundamental rights or guarantees of the parties. First, if a judge in the 
exercise of case management powers refuses leave (permission) to a party to amend 
his or her pleading or to call a witness due to procedural failure it would clearly 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Curtin University, Western Australia; Visiting Professor, University of 
Johannesburg. 
**  Senior Lecturer and Manager: Legal Aid Clinic, University of Stellenbosch. 
1 Cappelletti and Garth (eds) I Access to Justice: A World Survey (1978) 123.
2 The literature on the Woolf reforms is vast. Suffice it to mention the following sources: Andrews 
English Civil Procedure: Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice System (2003) 30; Andrews The 
Modern Civil Process (2008) 22; Sorabji English Civil Justice after the Woolf and Jackson Reforms 
(2014) 1-5; Bamford and Rankin Principles of Civil Litigation (2017) 8-9; Colbran, Spender, Jackson 
and Douglas Civil Procedure: Commentary and Materials (2012) 50-51. 
3 Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 31 and 38.
4 Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 36-37; Andrews (n 2 (2008)) 7; see De Vos and Broodryk “Managerial judging 
and alternative dispute resolution in Australia: an example for South Africa to emulate?” (part 1) 2017 
TSAR 683 684 with regard to the position in Australia.
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infringe the party’s right to present its case properly, ie to be heard.5 Secondly, if 
a judge in the exercise of case management powers strongly advises the parties to 
pursue mediation and stays the proceedings pending the outcome of this process6 or 
directs the parties to proceed to mediation, the practical effect of such intervention 
by the judge would be to deny the parties their right of access to a court to obtain a 
judicial determination on the merits of the case.7
The aim of this article is to examine the ways in which the fundamental procedural 
rights of civil litigants receive recognition in Australia and South Africa and to 
assess to what extent modern reforms to civil procedure, including the phenomena 
of case management and the drive from trial adjudication to mediation, affect these 
rights. In other words, the key question is whether the two systems are on a good 
path regarding the protection of the fundamental rights of the parties or whether 
there is cause for concern. 
Before discussing the main theme of this paper it would be appropriate to 
present a short excursus on the recognition of the fundamental procedural rights 
of civil litigants generally and on procedural reform in England over approximately 
the past 150 years, culminating in the Woolf reforms of the 1990s. This will provide 
 the necessary background for the main theme.
2  Short excursus on the recognition of the fundamental procedural rights of civil 
litigants and on civil procedural reform in England over the past 150 years
2.1  The recognition of the fundamental rights of civil litigants – a brief 
comparative perspective
The recognition of the fundamental rights of civil litigants in different legal systems 
was a relevant topic in two previous studies conducted by one of the authors.8 In the 
present context the topic forms part of the relevant background for the development 
of the main theme. It is therefore necessary to include a brief updated commentary 
on the subject matter under this excursus.
Developed legal systems worldwide accord certain fundamental procedural rights 
or guarantees to the parties in civil litigation. This entails certain basic requirements 
that must be complied with to ensure that procedural justice is achieved.9 These 
requirements, which include the age-old and well-known audi alteram partem (hear 
the other side) principle, form the raison d’être of all the specific rules regulating 
the litigation process.10 The fundamental rights or guarantees accorded to the parties 
thus constitute the principles, ie the theoretical foundation, upon which most of the 
specific rules regulating civil litigation are based. Andrews succinctly explains the 
role of these principles: “The most important point is that principles are general in 
their scope. They help to identify the connections between legal rules. If rules can 
5 See De Vos and Broodryk “Managerial judging and alternative dispute resolution in Australia: an 
example for South Africa to emulate?” (part 2) 2018 TSAR 18 20-22.
6 See Andrews (n 2 (2008) 212.
7 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 22; Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 227.
8 See De Vos Grondslae van die Siviele Prosesreg (1988 thesis RAU) ch 2; De Vos “Die grondwetlike 
beskerming van siviele prosesregtelike waarborge in Suid-Afrika” 1991 TSAR 353.
9 See Habscheid (ed) Effectiveness of Judicial Protection and Constitutional Order (1983) 15 et seq.
10 De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 355.
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be likened to bricks, principles are the foundations and girders which support the 
great legal edifice.”11 
Different legal systems follow different approaches in giving recognition to 
fundamental civil procedural rights or guarantees. In a broad sense three typical 
approaches can be identified: (i) the rights are not expressly recognised but can 
be implied from specific rules; (ii) the rights are expressly stated in legislation or 
a code but enjoy no higher status than other ordinary legislation; (iii) the rights 
are proclaimed in a constitution which enjoys a supreme status above ordinary 
legislation and requires all legislation to be consistent with such rights.
2.1.1 Rights are not expressly recognised but can be implied from specific rules
According to the first approach the fundamental procedural rights are not expressly 
proclaimed in a constitution or ordinary legislation. They can be identified only by 
way of inferences from specific procedural rules. Court decisions are also more 
inclined to deal with detailed rules than with broad principles.
The traditional position in England, prior to the adoption of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, serves as a good example of this approach. The right to be heard (audi 
alteram partem) and other civil procedural principles were not expressly mentioned 
in legislation, such as the Supreme Court Act 1981, and court decisions on procedure 
dealt rather with detail than with any principles. Jolowicz was to the point when he 
observed that “English law tends rather to take [these guarantees] for granted than 
to enshrine [them] in a legislative text”.12 This does not mean of course that such 
principles had no place in the traditional system. It simply means that they had to 
be implied from specific rules or case law dealing with statutory provisions or court 
rules. Quoting Jolowicz again:
“[T]he English tradition places little faith in broad statements of sweeping general principle. Being, 
both in its legislation and in its case-law, pragmatic and not theoretical in style, the fundamental 
principles of English law can be discovered only by a process of extrapolation or generalisation 
from a host of individual instances.”13
Needless to say, these principles did not enjoy any special protection. The British 
parliament could at any stage adopt legislation infringing the fundamental rights 
of the parties, even though this is unlikely since procedural justice is embedded 
in the common-law system.14 The traditional English approach also found its way 
into the former British colonies in Australia and still holds sway in the states and 
territories that have not adopted human rights acts.15 That was also the position 
in South Africa before the adoption of a supreme constitution with a bill of rights 
entrenching not only substantive human rights but also fundamental procedural 
rights in both criminal and civil proceedings.16
11 Principles of Civil Procedure (1994) 13. Also see Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 52-54; Andrews “Fundamental 
principles of civil procedure: order out of chaos” in Kramer and Van Rhee (eds) Civil Litigation in a 
Globalising World (2012) 19 20.
12 Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation (1973) 664.
13 Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) (n 12) 172.
14 Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) (n 12) 670; De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 357.
15 See par 3 below.
16 See par 4 below.
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2.1.2  Rights are expressly stated in legislation or a code but enjoy no higher 
status than other ordinary legislation
In accordance with the second approach a state may adopt an act on human rights 
which includes certain fundamental civil procedural rights or, if it is a codified legal 
system, a state may include such rights in the civil procedure code. In both instances 
the instrument containing the relevant rights is accorded an important status and 
must be heeded by the courts in the interpretation of other statutory provisions. 
However, such an instrument enjoys no higher status than ordinary legislation or 
law and courts cannot declare an act which is inconsistent with the human rights 
instrument invalid. The following systems are illustrative of this approach.
The French Code de Procedure Civile contains a chapter setting out the guiding 
principles which form the foundation of all the rules regulating the civil process.17 
These principles include especially the different aspects of the adversary principle 
(principe du contradictoire), such as the right to be heard, the right to be apprised 
of the opponent’s case and the duty of the judge to respect the adversary principle.18 
The guiding principles are an important cornerstone of French civil procedure 
but they enjoy no higher status than the ordinary law of the land. Changes could 
therefore be made to these principles in the same way as in the case of other ordinary 
legislative provisions and courts have no power to review legislation that has been 
promulgated.19 However, the position must be qualified by taking into account the 
application of article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (European Convention) by the French 
courts. Ferrand explains:
“[T]he principles of effective access to justice, due process of law, right to a judge provided by 
law, the adversarial nature of the proceedings in the presence of the parties involved (principe 
contradictoire, ...), reasonable time to reach a decision or the right to enforcement of court decisions 
are usually interpreted and applied in accordance with this international legal instrument.”20
Although the principles contained in the French code could be changed by the 
ordinary legislative process in France the authors submit that the European 
Convention acts as a supra-national protective measure to ensure that procedural 
justice will be maintained in French courts.
Examples in the common law world of the second approach to the recognition of 
fundamental procedural rights of civil litigants include the United Kingdom and the 
two Australian jurisdictions that adopted human rights acts, namely Victoria and 
the Australian Capital Territory. 
17 See Cadiet “The new French code of civil procedure (1975)” in Van Rhee (ed) European Traditions 
in Civil Procedure (2005) 49 56. The Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile of 1975, which replaced 
the Code de Procedure Civile of 1806, underwent some modifications and was renamed Code de 
Procedure Civile in 2007. This was done by means of s 26 of loi 2007 - 1787, 20-12-2007 – see https://
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_de_procedure_civile (France) (30-12-2018).
18 s 14-17 of the Code de Procedure Civile – see sources quoted above (n 17); also see Dadomo and 
Farran The French Legal System (1993) 152.
19 De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 357-358; Dadomo and Farran (n 18) 108-109. The Conseil Constitutionnel 
can review and invalidate legislation that has been passed by parliament but not yet promulgated 
if it is not in conformity with the constitution. This can be done on request of the president of the 
Republic, the president of the national assembly, the president of the senate or 60 members of the 
national assembly or 60 senators – a 61 and 62 of the French Constitution of 4-10-1958, as amended 
up to 23-7-2008 – see https//wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/179092 (2-1-2019).
20 “The French approach to the globalisation and harmonisation of civil procedure” in Kramer and Van 
Rhee (n 11) 335 337.
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The United Kingdom adopted the Human Rights Act 1998 incorporating most of 
the European Convention’s provisions into its domestic law.21 From a civil procedural 
perspective the most important provision is article 6(1) of the European Convention, 
which proclaims the right to “a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.22 Although the right 
of access to justice is not expressly mentioned the European court of human rights 
held that it must be implied and this reasoning has been adopted by the British 
courts.23 An analysis of the meaning ascribed to each right by the European court 
of human rights, the British courts and commentators falls outside the scope of this 
article. Andrews remarks aptly that the “[e]nactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 
has produced a cascade of literature”.24 To this must be added all the literature on 
the European Convention and the case law of the European court of human rights, 
as well as British case law on the Human Rights Act. It is indeed an enormous 
body of literature and case law. Suffice it therefore to summarise the essence of this 
provision. It provides inter alia for the following rights:
(a)  access to justice, including access to a lawyer and legal aid (implied right);
(b)  a public hearing;
(c)  a hearing within a reasonable time;
(d)  a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law;
(e)  effective enforcement of a judgment (implied right); and
(f)  a fair hearing. This is a wide concept embracing several subsidiary rights 
(implied), including:
 (i)  the right to notice of the proceedings and the nature of the opponent’s case;
 (ii)  the right to equality of arms, ie the parties must be treated equally;
 (iii)  the right to be present at an adversarial hearing, to present evidence and to 
challenge (cross-examine) the opponent’s witnesses; and
 (iv)  the right to a reasoned judgment.25 
Case law of the European court of human rights and the British courts indicates 
that, “[s]ubject to a limited number of absolute guarantees”,26 the fundamental 
rights of individuals are not absolute and limitations may therefore be imposed in 
legitimate cases.27 In the authors’ opinion absolute guarantees certainly include the 
right to a hearing presided over by an independent and impartial judicial officer. It is 
submitted that these qualities of the bench cannot be limited without compromising 
the entire proceedings.28 
21 The act came into operation on 2-10-2000 – Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 149.
22 Sch 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 – see Wadham and Mountfield Human Rights Act 1998 (2000) 
178.
23 Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 156, citing the European court of human rights’ decision in Golder v UK 1975 1 
EHRR 524 536, and 172-186 where the author discusses UK case law on the access to justice principle.
24 (n 2 (2003)) 149 n 4.
25 See Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 149-186; Wadham and Mountfield (n 22) 87-92; Uzelac and Van Rhee (eds) 
Access to Justice: Towards New European Standards of Affordability, Quality and Efficiency in Civil 
Adjudication (2009) 1-2.
26 Brown v Stott 2001 2 WLR 817 (PC) 839-840; Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 151.
27 See eg Ashingdane v UK 1985 7 EHRR 528 upholding a restriction preventing a mental patient from 
suing a mental hospital except if the latter had been guilty of negligence or bad faith; Andrews (n 2 
(2003)) 157-159.
28 See Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) (n 12) where Jolowicz remarked: “Without a judiciary which can and 
will administer the law fairly and fearlessly ..., no other guarantee given to the parties is likely to be of 
value.”
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The Human Rights Act broke with the past by importing a supra-national 
standard into domestic law and by obliging courts to decide cases compatibly 
with the rights and freedoms contained in the European Convention and some of 
its protocols (referred to as “Convention rights” in the Human Rights Act).29 The 
courts are also required to interpret legislation in conformity with such rights 
wherever possible.30 Although the Human Rights Act imported a standard to which 
legislation should, as a rule, conform it still remains part of ordinary legislation and 
courts have no authority to invalidate legislation which they find to be incompatible 
with a convention right.31 However, a court can declare a legislative provision to be 
incompatible with a convention right, whereafter the matter will be referred to the 
government to consider taking remedial action in collaboration with parliament.32 
This approach, which has been called the dialogue model,33 ensures in the authors’ 
view that parliamentary sovereignty is maintained. Although the incorporation of 
the European Convention’s provisions into the United Kingdom’s domestic law 
did not create an instrument with a higher status than other legislation, as is the 
case with a supreme constitution, it was nevertheless a watershed in the United 
Kingdom’s history. The convention rights established a yardstick against which 
legislation had to, and still has to, be measured to assess its compatibility. In the 
authors’ view these rights laid the foundation for the development of a human rights 
culture in the British legal system. The impact of the European Convention on this 
legal system was eloquently worded by an eminent British judge: “The European 
Convention, by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, now permeates, actually or 
potentially, every aspect of our law. Nothing can now be properly conceptualized 
without the added human rights dimension ...”34
The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000, which offers wider 
protection of human rights than the Human Rights Act, is also still applicable in the 
United Kingdom, but all indications are that it will cease to apply after Brexit.35 This 
instrument falls outside the ambit of this paper.
The position in the two Australian jurisdictions is discussed below.36
2.1.3  Rights are proclaimed in a constitution which enjoys a supreme status above 
ordinary legislation
According to the third approach the fundamental rights of civil litigants, together 
with other fundamental human rights and freedoms, are usually entrenched in a bill 
or charter of rights included in a supreme constitution to which all legislation must 
29 s 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The articles of the European Convention in which the rights 
and freedoms are proclaimed are set out in sch 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 – see Wadham and 
Mountfield (n 22) 5 and 177.
30 Wadham and Mountfield (n 22) 5.
31 The government is required when launching a bill through parliament to state whether its provisions 
are compatible with the convention rights, but if they are not the government could still proceed – s 19 
of the Human Rights Act 1998; Wadham and Mountfield (n 22) 173.
32 s 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998; only the superior courts have the power to make such a declaration 
– s 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998; Wadham and Mountfield (n 22) 169 and 165.
33 Colbran et al (n 2) 28.
34 Sedley “One year later” 2001 Judicial Studies Board Journal 7 cited by Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 172.
35 In 2018 both houses of parliament voted against retaining the EU Charter after Brexit and its fate 
therefore seems to be sealed. See Cooper “The fate of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in UK law 
after Brexit is sealed” (20-06-2018) - ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-fate-of-the-charter-of-fundamental-rights-
in-english-law-after-brexit-is-sealed/ (3-01-2019).
36 See par 3 below.
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conform. A concomitant feature of this approach is the power of judicial review 
entrusted to the courts to ensure compliance of legislation (and other state action) 
with the constitution. The American, Canadian, German and South African systems 
are typical examples of this approach. The German system falls outside the ambit of 
this paper, while the South African system is discussed below.37 A brief exposition 
of the position in the United States of America (USA) and Canada follows. The 
focus falls on the federal level. 
The Constitution of the United States of America of 1787 is the “supreme Law of 
the Land,”38 meaning all the federal and state laws of the United States of America 
must conform to its provisions, and the courts are empowered to invalidate legislation 
found to be unconstitutional.39 An interesting aspect of the constitution is that it 
does not expressly provide for judicial review of legislation. However, in Marbury 
v Madison, decided in 1803, the supreme court of the United States of America, in 
an opinion written by Marshall CJ, established the principle of judicial review of 
legislation, which has endured ever since.40 This judicial power, as it evolved, is not 
confined to the supreme court, as Cappelletti explains:
“Although there is neither a special, differentiated proceeding to attack unconstitutional statutes 
before the courts, nor any court specially created for that purpose, unconstitutional statutes relevant 
to the decision of any civil or criminal case must be set aside by any court as an incidental issue to 
the decision of the concrete case. Stare decisis, then does the rest: once the constitutional issue has 
been decided by the highest court through the normal means of attack, the unconstitutional statute, 
although still ‘on the books’, has become ‘a dead law’ for all practical effects.”41
The 27 amendments which have been added to the constitution over the course 
of just over 200 years contain a number of fundamental human rights, not only 
those that are relevant in criminal cases but also those that have a bearing on civil 
proceedings.42 The most important fundamental rights accorded to civil litigants 
are undoubtedly the famous “due process of law” and “equal protection of the laws” 
guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868. The relevant 
part of the amendment reads as follows:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”.43
37 The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), adopted in 1949 and retained with modifications after unification 
of Germany in 1990, provides for the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, as well 
as basic procedural rights, and a federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) empowered 
to invalidate legislation found to be inconsistent with the basic law. See De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 
360; Church, Schulze and Strydom Human Rights from a Comparative and International Perspective 
(2007) 99; https://www.brittanica.com/topic/Federal-Constitutional-Court (5-1-2019). The position in 
South Africa is discussed in par 4 below. 
38 a 6 of the constitution – https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi (5-1-2019).
39 De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 359-360; Church et al (n 37) ch 8 generally.
40 5 US 1 Cranch 137 (1803); De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 360; Campbell and Hepperle The US Legal 
System (1983) 172-173; Abraham The Judicial Process (1993) 270-288 citing numerous cases in 
which this power was exercised; https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/ (5-01-2019).
41 Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) (n 12) 674-677.
42 The first 10 amendments, which are contained in the form of the bill of rights, were all passed in 1791 
while the remaining 17 amendments were adopted over the next two centuries, the 27th Amendment 
being added in 1992. See Church et al (n 37) 132-133; https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/
constitution-transcript (5-1-2019).
43 s 1 of the 14th Amendment. See https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h926.html (5-01-2019); Church et 
al (n 37) 134.
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The due process requirement is especially important because the courts decided 
in numerous cases since its adoption that most of the rights falling under the first 
ten amendments, ie the bill of rights, must be incorporated under the due process 
provisions. In other words, due process is also applicable when those rights are 
exercised and it embraces fair procedures, such as due notice of the proceedings 
and the right to be heard, not only in criminal cases but also in civil proceedings 
generally.44
The Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, proclaims itself as the “supreme law 
of Canada”, adding that “any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect”.45 A 
cornerstone of the Constitution Act is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contained 
in part I of the act.46 The charter entrenches a number of fundamental rights, 
including procedural guarantees, especially applicable in criminal cases, but it also 
has a provision relevant to civil proceedings, viz section 15. It provides as follows: 
“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination ....”47 The equality 
principle embodied in this provision seems to be predominantly aimed at protection 
against all forms of discrimination.48 However, it is submitted that the wording of 
the provision is wide enough to embrace fundamental procedural guarantees, such 
as equal treatment of parties in civil litigation and other related procedural rights. 
Before elaborating on the fundamental rights of civil litigants it is important 
to note that the Constitution Act clearly gives recognition to judicial review of 
legislation that violates the constitution. Section 24(1) of the charter provides as 
follows: “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain 
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”49
The jurisdiction of the court to entertain such an application clearly includes the 
power to invalidate legislation that breaches the provisions of the charter.50 As is 
the case in the United States of America, any court seized of a matter in which the 
compatibility of a statute with the charter is raised, be it a criminal or civil court, 
may decide the issue. Whether the court is “a court of competent jurisdiction” is 
therefore determined by jurisdictional rules “external to the Charter itself”.51 
Except for the equality provision and a section dealing with the protection of 
a witness who gave self-incriminating evidence at any proceeding,52 the charter 
does not contain any rights with a direct bearing on civil litigation. However, the 
Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, which has not been repealed with the adoption of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, embodies a core provision which lies at the heart 
of procedural justice in Canada, viz section 2. It reads as follows: 
44 De Vos (n 8 (1991 TSAR)) 359; Church et al (n 37) 142 and 144.
45 Church et al (n 37) 86; https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/ (5-01-2019).
46 Church et al (n 37) 86.
47 See https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.html (4-01-2019).
48 Church et al (n 37) 86-87.
49 Church et al (n 37) 92; https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-c-11/
latest/schedule-b (6-01-2019).
50 Church et al (n 37) 86.
51 Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1985 1 SCR 177 222; Church et al (n 37) 
94.
52 s 15 and 13 of the charter respectively.
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“[N]o law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to ... 
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.”53
The shortcoming of the bill of rights has been that it is only a statute and not a 
constitutional instrument with a status above ordinary legislation. It further only 
applies to the federal level and not the provinces, unlike the charter which applies 
to both. Its main purpose was to serve as an instrument in aid of the interpretation 
of other statutes.54 Despite the limited status of the bill of rights as an instrument 
of construction the courts have managed somehow to ascribe a somewhat higher 
status to the bill than ordinary federal legislation. This is illustrated by the following 
dictum of Laskin J in Hogan v The Queen: “The Canadian Bill of Rights is a half-
way house between a purely common law regime and a constitutional one; it may 
aptly be described as a quasi-constitutional instrument.”55
It appears therefore that a distinction needs to be drawn between the status of the 
equality clause of the charter and the fair hearing provision of the bill of rights. The 
equality section enjoys supreme status as part of the supreme constitution, whereas 
the fair trial principle embodied in the bill of rights has the status of an ordinary 
statute. However, as mentioned, the latter attained a somewhat higher status through 
case law.
2.2 Civil procedural reform in England over the past 150 years
In order to assess the position regarding the fundamental rights of civil litigants in 
Australia and South Africa at present it is necessary to take a brief look at the main 
features of reforms to the civil justice system in England over the past 150 years. 
They provided the stimulus for developments in the former British territories. This 
brief exposition is mainly sourced from Sorabji,56 which may be summarised under 
the following headings:
2.2.1 The position prior to 1873
Prior to the fundamental reforms of 1873-1875 the common law was applied in the 
common law courts while equity was administered in a single superior court, the 
court of Chancery presided over by the Lord Chancellor.57 The respective approaches 
of the two court structures in dispensing substantive justice differed fundamentally.
The proceedings in the common law courts were characterised by absolute 
formalism. There was no clear separation between substantive and procedural law. 
The party seeking a remedy from the court had to select the right form of action 
and then comply strictly with the distinct procedure applicable to that specific type 
of action. Selection of the wrong form of action or, if the right form of action was 
selected, any deviation from the applicable procedure resulted in dismissal of the 
action. Justice could be dispensed only when there was absolute compliance in both 
respects.58 Thus, procedure was not a means to an end but an end in itself. In other 
53 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-12.3/page-1.html (4-01-2019).
54 Church et al (n 37) 84.
55 1975 2 SCR 574 579; Church et al (n 37) 84.
56 (n 2) ch 2 and 4-7; also see Van Rhee (ed) (n 17) 129-159. 
57 Several courts were charged with the duty to apply the common law, particularly the court of common 
pleas, King’s or Queen’s bench and court of exchequer. See Sorabji (n 2) 14 and 38. 
58 Sorabji (n 2) 34-36.
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words, procedure was the master and not the servant of justice.59 This regime was 
aptly coined as “procedural despotism”.60
In the court of Chancery there was a clear distinction drawn between equity and 
procedure, and the same procedure applied irrespective of the nature of the claim.61 
Equity’s policy was to achieve complete justice between the parties and procedural 
error was not allowed to jeopardise this outcome. Procedure was therefore a means 
to an end and not an end in itself.62 In due course the court of Chancery also adopted 
a body of technical and complex procedural rules and required strict compliance 
therewith. However, the policy of finding the truth and dispensing complete justice 
remained in place. In other words, the court was committed to deciding every case 
on its merits, thus securing substantive justice, and would not dismiss a claim on 
the basis of procedural failure.63 The pursuit of complete justice was regarded as 
all-important, with the result that the time and cost involved in this quest were not 
seen as issues. This policy coupled with a system of complex rules gave rise to a 
practice of raising procedural points whenever possible.64 The result in the end was 
intolerable delays. A leading commentator at the time remarked that “[n]o man ... can 
enter into a Chancery suit with a reasonable hope of being alive at its determination, 
if he has a determined adversary”.65
2.2.2  Reforms of 1873-1875 and adoption of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
(Rules) 1875
The reforms introduced by the Judicature Act of 1873, as amended by the Judicature 
Act of 1875, and the Rules of 1875 created a totally different litigation landscape 
regarding structure, procedure and theory of justice. A new court structure, the 
supreme court of judicature, consisting of the high court and the court of appeal was 
created in which both common law and equity would henceforth be administered. In 
other words, common law and equity were merged and the new procedure laid down 
in the Rules would apply, irrespective of the nature of the claim.66 The common-law 
forms of action were abolished and a less complex, simpler procedure was adopted, 
which was illustrated inter alia by the introduction of fact pleading.67 Furthermore, 
the jury, which featured only in common law trials and played no part in equity 
proceedings, was relegated to “the exception rather than the rule”.68 The structural and 
procedural changes were accompanied by the adoption of equity’s theory of complete 
justice. In other words, the courts were henceforth tasked with the duty of deciding 
cases on their merits and not allowing procedural error to frustrate a claim, thus 
securing substantive justice between the parties.69 A court would therefore always 
correct procedural mistakes to allow the case to be decided on its merits, unless 
59 Sorabji (n 2) 37.
60 Sorabji (n 2) 36 citing Sutherland “Joinder of actions” 1919-1920 Michigan Law Review 571 573.
61 Sorabji (n 2) 39.
62 Sorabji (n 2) 39.
63 Sorabji (n 2) 45.
64 Sorabji (n 2) 43.
65 Cited in Sorabji (n 2) 33 with reference to O’Main “Traditional equity and contemporary procedure” 
2003 Washington Law Review 429 448 and generally Spence The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court 
of Chancery (1846).
66 See Sorabji (n 2) 56 et seq. Sorabji also shows that the reforms of 1873-1875 were a culmination of a 
reform process that started in earnest in the 1850s, (46 - 56); also see Van Rhee (ed) (n 17) 147-149.
67 Sorabji (n 2) 59; Van Rhee (ed) (n 17) 151.
68 Sorabji (n 2) 58.
69 Sorabji (n 2) 56-58.
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prejudice to the other side could not be addressed by way of a costs order or other 
appropriate relief.70 Sorabji states that this outcome “is often, and correctly, presented 
as the triumph of equity over the common law”.71 The adoption of equity’s approach 
to achieving substantive justice took some twenty years to be fully embraced by the 
courts, but once the rejuvenated theory of justice was established it remained in place 
until the implementation of the Woolf reforms in the 1990s.72
2.2.3  The Woolf reforms of the 1990s
The new civil procedural code73 embodied in the Civil Procedure Rules, 1999, which 
flowed from Lord Woolf’s access to justice reports,74 set out, like the judicature acts 
and Rules of the 1870s had done, to introduce a totally new litigation landscape. 
This was achieved mainly by adopting a transformed procedural system and a new 
theory of justice. The reasons advanced for the need radically to transform the civil 
justice system were, as mentioned, the perceived ills of “high cost of litigation, 
delay and complexity” which plagued the previous regime.75 The view has been 
formed that the emphasis on achieving substantive justice and the relaxed approach 
regarding compliance with procedural rules had resulted in excessive delays and 
costs.76 
As mentioned, the keystone of the Woolf reforms, introduced to address the 
stated evils, thus rendering justice more accessible, simplifying and expediting 
proceedings and saving costs, was judicial case management.77 In the words of Lord 
Woolf, there had to be “a fundamental transfer of responsibility for the management 
of civil litigation from litigants and their legal advisors to the courts”.78 As managers 
of the proceedings, especially during the pre-trial phase, judges acquired the power 
and the duty to see to it that the parties comply with the prescribed procedural 
rules.79 This was undoubtedly a radical departure from the past, which was 
dominated by party control.80 As alluded to, another important mechanism in the 
overall strategy, which goes hand in hand with case management, is the promotion 
of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, aimed at settling the dispute.81 
Ardent supporters of this drive away from trial adjudication to mediation see this 
form of dispute resolution as the panacea that will cure the civil justice system of its 
ills. It is therefore regarded as the preferred way of resolving a dispute, while trial 
adjudication is seen as a failure.82 
The transformation of procedure was accompanied by the adoption of a new theory 
of justice, which replaced the previous regime’s theory of achieving substantive 
70 Tildesley v Harper 10 ChD 393 (1876) cited by Sorabji (n 2) 62.
71 (n 2) 56.
72 See Sorabji (n 2) 68.
73 Civil Procedure Rules 1.1(1) describes the Civil Procedure Rules as a “new procedural code”.
74 Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995) and Access to Justice: Final Report (1996); Kramer and Van 
Rhee (eds) (n 11) 28.
75 See Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 31; par 1 above.
76 See Sorabji (n 2) 73.
77 Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 37 and 337; par 1 above.
78 Interim Report ch 4 par 2 cited by Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 37.
79 See generally Andrews (n 2 (2003)) ch 13 and 14.
80 Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 334.
81 See Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 39, 131 and 539; par 1 above.
82 See Genn, who is an eloquent critic of the drive away from trial to mediation, “What is justice for – 
reform, alternative dispute resolution, and access to justice” 2012 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 
397 409. According to her, judicial determination is rather the “heart and essential purpose” of the civil 
justice system.
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justice at the cost of procedural compliance. Sorabji, who is clearly an ardent 
supporter of the Woolf reforms to their full extent, coined the new theory as one of 
“proportionate justice”.83 In a nutshell this means that dispensing substantive justice 
between the parties is not the primary and only goal of the civil justice system. 
The new theory, as reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules’ “overriding objective of 
dealing with cases justly”84 has a much wider ambit in that consideration is given 
not only to the interests of the parties but also, and especially, to the position of other 
litigants waiting to be heard and the effective use of the court’s resources. The aim 
is therefore to secure “an equitable distribution of the court’s resources among all 
litigants”.85 This may have the result that individual justice is not attained in a given 
case if, in the court’s view, its achievement would undermine the efficient functioning 
of the court’s processes and the ability of other litigants to access the justice system. 
According to Sorabji such an outcome is justified on the basis of proportionate 
justice for all which is supported by the wider public interest.86 Proportionate justice 
further means that judges must ensure strict procedural compliance and impose 
sanctions in the case of failure to comply; otherwise the effective functioning of the 
court and its ability to provide equitable access to all might be impaired.87 Finally, 
the concept of proportionate justice also entails that resources and time must be 
allocated to cases on a proportionate basis, taking into account inter alia the value 
of the claim, the complexity of the issues and the importance of the case.88 In the 
authors’ view such proportionate treatment of cases inevitably means that all cases 
cannot aspire to receive the same form of justice. Cases involving complex issues 
and huge claims receive preference in terms of time and resources and therefore the 
best form of justice, while less complex cases and cases involving smaller claims 
must be satisfied with less time and resources and thus a more limited form of 
justice. The question may be asked if this is truly justice.
According to Sorabji it became apparent ten years after the Woolf reforms 
that they had failed to cure the justice system of its ills, especially the high cost 
of litigation.89 He identifies case management as the crucial area where the new 
theory of justice failed. According to Sorabji the crux of the matter was “that courts 
had failed to eradicate the previous lax approach to rule compliance and the liberal 
approach to procedural default that had characterised the RSC”.90 The reason for 
this has been the courts’ inclination still to strive to achieve substantive justice in 
individual cases.91 He laments this attitude by judges whom he calls “traditionalists” 
and suggests that they “will need to be educated and the rejectionist approach laid 
to rest”.92
The Woolf reforms were followed by the Jackson review of litigation costs of 2009, 
which recommended certain changes to inter alia the “litigation funding regime”.93 
83 (n 2) 136.
84 Civil Procedure Rules 1.1; Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 38.
85 Sorabji (n 2) 136.
86 (n 2) 180 and 217.
87 Sorabji (n 2) 209; Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 364.
88 This was done by the creation of different procedural case tracks for different cases. See Sorabji (n 2) 
183 and 188; Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 38-41.
89 (n 2) 201 where he states: “Litigation was as expensive as ever, if not more so.” 
90 (n 2) 203.
91 (n 2) 203.
92 Sorabji (n 2) 211.
93 Sorabji (n 2) 202, citing Jackson The Review of Civil Litigation Costs in England and Wales (2009).
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These recommendations were implemented in 2013.94 It appears that no fundamental 
procedural changes flowed from the Jackson reforms but an important amendment 
of the overriding objective stated in Civil Procedure Rules 1 was implemented on 1 
April 2013.95 The overriding objective of dealing with cases “justly” was amplified 
by adding the phrase “and at proportionate cost”.96 And the subsection which sets 
out measures included under dealing with cases justly now contains a new item 
which expressly tasks the courts with the duty of “enforcing compliance with rules, 
practice directions and orders”.97 It appears that the addition of these “explicit 
references to proportionate costs and rule-compliance” was a strategy aimed at 
ensuring that courts fully embrace the new theory of proportionate justice.98 Time 
will tell how the courts will react to this.
 The proponents of alternative dispute resolution continue with their quest to 
promote alternative dispute resolution methods, especially mediation, as the preferred 
method of dispute resolution above trial adjudication, but for now the position in the 
United Kingdom remains a voluntary regime, subject to strong persuasion from the 
bench and the legal profession. In its recent report on alternative dispute resolution 
and civil justice the civil justice council stopped short of recommending compulsory 
alternative dispute resolution as a condition for instituting proceedings. However, it 
made several recommendations aimed at making the parties aware and persuading 
them of the benefits of alternative dispute resolution methods, such as mediation.99 
In the authors’ view the council obviously had to be conscious of the access to 
justice guarantee, which is one of the implied convention rights incorporated in the 
Human Rights Act, 1998.100
2.2.4  Questions for consideration in the context of the Australian and South 
African systems
(a) In view of the ever-expanding role of the case management regime in common 
law systems requiring strict rule-compliance, could this be seen as a return to 
formalism? It is clearly not the kind of formalism that held sway in England prior 
to the reforms of 1873-1875. But is it not formalism nevertheless, in the sense that 
procedural error may result in the imposition of a judicial sanction causing an 
arguable claim to fail, which in turn means that substantive justice is not being 
achieved? What about a party’s right to present his or her case fully and obtain a 
judicial determination on the merits? Has rule-compliance not become an end in 
itself, instead of a means to an end, viz to achieve justice? Finally, in the context 
of promoting the theory of proportionate justice frequent references are made to 
other litigants waiting to be heard and the court’s limited resources that must be 
94 Sorabji (n 2) 205.
95 Sorabji (n 2) 214.
96 Civil Procedure Rules 1.1(1).
97 Civil Procedure Rules 1.1(2)(f); Sorabji (n 2) 214.
98 See Sorabji (n 2) 215.
99 See Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice CJC alternative dispute resolution Working 
Group Final Report (Nov 2018) s 9: recommendations.
100 This was in line with the submission of the law society to the council (n 99) summary; par 2.1.2 above; 
see also Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust; Steel v Joy and Halliday 2004 4 All ER 920 
par 4-11, 9 and 50-54 in which the court of appeal declined to make an adverse costs order against 
the defendant trust because of its refusal to take part in mediation. The court endorsed the judicial 
encouragement of the parties to mediate but cautioned that, having regard to art 6 of the European 
Convention, “to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to impose 
an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the court” (par 9).
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distributed equitably among all litigants.101 Are these not mythical concepts? What 
empirical research is there to back this up? How many litigants are waiting to be 
heard and how limited are the court’s resources?102
(b) Given the relentless drive from trial adjudication to alternative dispute resolution, 
especially mediation, are the courts not diminishing their crucial constitutional 
role in the context of the adjudication of civil disputes, thus also impoverishing the 
development of the law through decided cases? And does this strategy not have an 
adverse effect on the parties’ right of access to a court for a judicial determination, 
ie the parties’ right to their day in court? Has this right not become a hollow 
guarantee?103
3  Position regarding fundamental civil procedural rights in Australia
3.1  Historical perspective
The influence of English law in the former British colonies in Australia, which 
became federal states in the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, ensured that all 
the different jurisdictions adopted the adversarial system of civil litigation and the 
traditional English approach regarding the recognition of the fundamental rights 
of litigants.104 Accordingly, the principle of party control was embraced and in 
typical common law style legislation, court rules and cases generally dealt with 
detailed procedural requirements and shied away from broad principled statements 
proclaiming the fundamental rights of litigants.105 In other words, as was the case 
under the traditional regime in England, the existence of the fundamental procedural 
rights or guarantees of the parties could be identified only by way of inferences from 
specific legislative provisions and case law dealing with procedural rules.106
3.2  Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(International Covenant) by Australia
In 1980 Australia ratified the International Covenant, which had entered into force 
in 1976.107 Article 14 of the International Covenant has an important bearing on 
both criminal and civil proceedings. The part which is relevant for civil proceedings 
reads as follows: “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In 
the determination of ... his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall 
101 See Sorabji (n 2) 225 and 136.
102 See Genn Judging Civil Justice (2009) 52 and 62-64 pointing out the lack of empirical research to serve 
as a basis for reform.
103 The role of case management and alternative dispute resolution in the context of civil litigation in 
Australia and South Africa were discussed by the authors previously – see De Vos and Broodryk (n 4 
and 5). In the present context the emphasis falls on the impact of these phenomena and other reforms on 
the fundamental rights of the parties in civil litigation. See also Andrews (n 2 (2003)) 212-214, where 
the author defends the current trend of quite significantly restricting the parties’ right to their day in 
court.
104 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 683; Carney The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and 
Territories (2006) 1.
105 See generally De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 683 and the sources cited there.
106 See Kendall and Curthoys Civil Procedure Western Australia (loose leaf) par 1.0.8B stating that “there 
are no positive words in a statute” proclaiming a party’s right to be heard but that it is nevertheless “a 
deep-rooted principle of the common law”.
107 Colbran et al (n 2) 27; www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1980/23.html (16-01-2019).
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be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”108
In the authors’ view the ratification of this covenant was clearly a significant 
symbolic act in the sphere of international relations. But domestically it has no 
legal effect at either federal or state level.109 The provisions of such an international 
treaty attain legal effect only when they are incorporated into the domestic law 
of a given country by means of legislation.110 Although Australia’s ratification of 
the International Covenant occurred close to forty years ago, not much has been 
achieved on local soil to honour this agreement. Numerous statutes bearing on certain 
human rights, such as anti-discrimination laws, have been passed at both federal 
and state level,111 but little progress has been made overall to adopt comprehensive 
human rights acts incorporating the provisions of the International Covenant. At 
federal level there is as yet no such statute but at least at state level Victoria and the 
Australian Capital Territory took the lead by adopting human rights acts just over a 
decade ago and Queensland is presently in the process of following suit.112
3.3  Adoption of human rights acts at state level in Australia
As mentioned, there are two acts to be considered in this context.
3.3.1  The Human Rights Act 2004 (Australian Capital Territory)113
The majority of human rights proclaimed in part 3 of this act are based on the 
provisions of the International Covenant.114 The most important provision in the 
context of civil proceedings is section 21 of the act, which enshrines the right to 
a fair trial. Under the heading “Fair trial” the relevant part of the section reads as 
follows: “Everyone has the right to have ... rights and obligations recognised by law, 
decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and 
public hearing.”115
There is clearly a close resemblance between section 21 and article 14 of the 
International Covenant, except that the section does not incorporate the right to 
equality before the law. The latter right is contained elsewhere in the act.116
 The salient features of the Human Rights Act can be summarised as follows.117 It 
is an ordinary act of the Australian Capital Territory’s legislative assembly, which 
is a unicameral legislative body. This means that the act has no higher status than 
other statutes of the Australian Capital Territory. It follows that the act adopted the 
108 Colbran et al (n 2) 27.
109 See Hemming and Penovic Civil Procedure in Australia (2015) 38.
110 Hemming and Penovic (n 109) 38.
111 See eg the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and Fair Work Act 2009 at 
federal level and the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) and Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) at state 
level.
112 See Colbran et al (n 2) 27-28; Human Rights Law Centre Annual Report 2018 3 – https://www.hrlc.
org.au/news/2018/12/20/our-2018-annual-report (15-01-2019). The report mentions that the centre is 
currently engaged in a nationwide campaign for the adoption of an Australian charter of human rights. 
It also indicates that a human rights act will be passed in Queensland in early 2019. 
113 The summary of the salient aspects of this act is mainly based on UNSW Gilbert and Tobin Centre 
of Public Law The Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act – see www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/
node/3074 (17-01-2019); also see www.austlii.edu.au/legis/act/consol_act/hra2004148/ (17-01-2019).
114 Gilbert and Tobin Centre (n 113).
115 s 21 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (Australian Capital Territory).
116 s 8 of the Human Rights Act (n 115).
117 See UNSW Gilbert and Tobin Centre (n 113).
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second approach regarding the recognition of fundamental rights discussed above.118 
The act provides that reasonable limits may be placed on human rights by laws that 
“can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.119 The act further 
requires the attorney-general to present a compatibility statement to the legislative 
assembly when a new bill is introduced indicating whether the bill is consistent 
with human rights and, if it is not, how it is inconsistent with such rights.120 The 
Australian Capital Territory legislative assembly followed the British example by 
adopting the dialogue model, which regulates the interaction between the courts and 
the legislature in cases where the compatibility of legislation with human rights is 
in issue.121 First, courts are enjoined to interpret legislation, as far as possible, in a 
way that is compatible with human rights122 and they may use “international human 
rights jurisprudence” to assist in the task.123 If the Australian Capital Territory 
supreme court finds that a legislative provision is inconsistent with any human right 
the court may issue a declaration of incompatibility, setting out such inconsistency, 
and notify the attorney-general, who must in turn notify the legislative assembly. 
The latter may then decide what action, if any, to take.124 Such a declaration of 
incompatibility does not affect the validity of the legislation in question.125
Since a court cannot invalidate a statutory provision which is inconsistent with 
any human right, its power of review is very limited. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that the rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act provide an important yardstick 
enabling the courts to test the compatibility of legislation with human rights and 
if appropriate to make a declaration of incompatibility. In the authors’ view the 
existence of the act provides a strong stimulus for the development of a human rights 
culture among the Australian Capital Territory’s judiciary and legal profession.126 
3.3.2  The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)127
The provisions of this charter correspond in all material respects to the Australian 
Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act.128 The rights proclaimed in the charter are 
also derived from the International Covenant and they likewise include the right to 
a fair trial. Under the heading “Fair hearing” the relevant part of section 24 provides 
as follows: “[A] party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the ... proceeding 
decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and 
public hearing.”129
The charter is also an ordinary act of the Victorian parliament and enjoys no 
higher status than other Victorian statutes. It follows that Victoria also aligned 
itself with the second approach regarding the protection of fundamental rights 
118 par 2.1.2 above.
119 s 28 of the Human Rights Act (n 115).
120 s 37 of the Human Rights Act (n 115).
121 See par 2.1.2 above; Colbran et al (n 2) 28.
122 s 30 of the Human Rights Act (n 115).
123 s 31 of the Human Rights Act (n 115); UNSW Gilbert and Tobin Centre (n 113) 3.
124 s 32(2) and 33 of the Human Rights Act (n 115); UNSW Gilbert and Tobin Centre (n 113) 4.
125 s 32(3) of the Human Rights Act (n 115).
126 See par 3.5 below where Australian Capital Territory case law is discussed.
127 See The Law Handbook 2018 – Your Practical Guide to the Law in Victoria - https://www.
lawhandbook.org.au/2018_11_01_07_charter_of_human_rights_and_responsibilities/ 
(17-1-2019); www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/cohrara2006433/ (17-01-2019).
128 See Hemming and Penovic (n 109) 32.
129 s 24 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
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discussed above.130 The charter further provides for the limitation of human rights 
under similar circumstances as in the Australian Capital Territory.131 A statement 
of compatibility must also be presented to the Victorian parliament, but in this case 
it must be done by the member of parliament introducing the bill.132 Victoria also 
adopted the dialogue model in so far as the compatibility of legislation with human 
rights is concerned. The courts must also interpret legislation as far as possible 
compatibly with human rights.133 If that is not possible the Victorian supreme court 
may declare a legislative provision incompatible with a human right134 and notify the 
attorney-general, who must in turn inform the responsible minister.135 The minister 
must then make a presentation to parliament to reconsider the statutory provision.136 
As in the case of the Australian Capital Territory, a declaration of incompatibility 
does not affect the validity of the legislation in question.137
The authors’ comments regarding the influence of the Australian Capital 
Territory’s human rights act apply equally to the Victorian charter. The numerous 
references to the charter’s provisions in Victorian case law bear testimony to its 
impact on the civil justice system in that state.138
3.3.3  Other jurisdictions
It follows from the discussion above that the other jurisdictions in Australia, which 
have not adopted human rights acts to incorporate the provisions of the International 
Covenant, maintain the traditional English common law approach regarding the 
recognition of fundamental rights of civil litigants.139
3.4  The new litigation landscape in Australia, especially judicial case management 
and alternative dispute resolution 
Judicial case management and alternative dispute resolution was the subject matter 
of a previous study by the authors.140 The idea with this article is therefore not 
to traverse the same terrain again. However, since the exercise of judicial case 
management powers, in conjunction with the use of alternative dispute resolution 
such as mediation, has the potential to limit or even deny parties their right to present 
their cases to a court for a judicial determination, it is necessary to recapitulate the 
essence of the subject matter.
The different jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the new philosophy regarding 
civil justice which emanated from the Woolf reforms with great enthusiasm and 
vigour. This was achieved by either adopting new civil procedure acts and court 
rules or by amending existing legislation and court rules.141 In the authors’ opinion 
130 par 2.1.2 above.
131 s 7 of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
132 s 28 of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
133 s 32 of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
134 s 36(2) of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
135 s 37 of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
136 s 37 of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129); Hemming and Penovic (n 109) 32.
137 s 36(5) of the Charter of Human Rights (n 129).
138 See par 5 below.
139 They are New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory. 
Queensland is expected soon to join Australian Capital Territory and Victoria by passing a human 
rights act – see n 112 and par 2.1.1 above.
140 De Vos and Broodryk (n 4 and 5).
141 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 687.
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the Australian jurisdictions effected this transformation of their litigation landscapes 
with even greater vigour than has been the case in England.
The salient features of the new litigation landscape can be summarised as 
follows.142
3.4.1  Overarching provisions
All jurisdictions in Australia at both federal and state/territory level have incorporated 
provisions in their statutory frameworks governing civil litigation in which the 
overarching or overriding objects of their civil procedural rules are proclaimed. The 
wording of the different statutory instruments differs, but in essence the goals are 
the same, viz to promote the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of 
disputes.143 Some jurisdictions also imposed overarching obligations on the parties 
and their lawyers to assist the court in achieving the proclaimed goals.144 In the 
authors’ view these overarching objectives, as expounded by case law, constitute the 
new theory of justice in Australia.
3.4.2  Judicial case management powers
The different jurisdictions in Australia at both federal and state/territory level 
have embraced the idea of judicial case management with great enthusiasm by 
adopting elaborate rules setting out the wide powers of judges to control litigation, 
especially during the pre-trial phase but even during the trial. Again, the wording 
of the different legislative measures differs, but broadly the powers of the various 
courts correspond.145 In essence the authority conferred upon judges comprises the 
power to give procedural directions covering a wide range of matters, all aimed at 
furthering the overarching objectives of the civil procedural rules. 
Judges acting as case managers may, for example, give directions relating 
to compliance with timetables for different procedural steps and to any pre-trial 
procedure, such as the amendment of pleadings, discovery of documents, inspection 
of objects or premises and exchange of witness statements.146 They may even give 
directions that interfere with the presentation of the parties’ respective cases at the 
trial, for example by limiting the number of witnesses to be called, limiting the 
time for examination and cross-examination of witnesses, limiting the time for oral 
arguments and ordering experts on opposing sides to confer.147 A recent amendment 
of the rules of the supreme court in Western Australia brought about a drastic change 
regarding a party’s right to present expert evidence. Order 36A provides as follows:
“A party may not adduce expert evidence at a trial ... unless –   
(a)  the case manager for the case has directed that the party may do so; and
(b)  the party has complied with all directions given in relation to that expert evidence.”148
142 This summary is based on De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 686-700 and (n 5) 20-24.
143 De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 686-689 referring to the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic); Supreme Court 
Rules 2005 (Vic) and Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); see also Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 79.
144 An example in this regard is Victoria – s 16-25 of the Civil Procedure Act (n 143); De Vos and 
Broodryk (n 4) 687.
145 See Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 79; Hemming and Penovic (n 109) 48-64.
146 De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) referring to the rules in Victoria and Western Australia; Hemming and 
Penovic (n 109) 48-64.
147 See eg order 34.5A of the Rules of the Supreme Court (WA) (n 143); De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 
689-690; Hemming and Penovic (n 109) 58-64; Cairns Australian Civil Procedure (2016) 112-116 and 
125-129.
148 Rules of the Supreme Court (WA) (n 143).
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In the authors’ view the presentation of evidence, including expert evidence, is an 
essential element of a party’s right to be heard (audi alteram partem). To limit the 
number of experts a party wishes to call or to direct the experts on opposing sides to 
confer in order to narrow the issues may be justifiable in appropriate circumstances. 
But to abolish a party’s right to call an expert witness and make the presentation of 
such evidence dependent on the case manager’s discretion appears to be a radical 
departure from one of the core components of the right to a fair trial.149
 The compilation of practice directions or notes, amplifying court rules, in the 
different supreme courts in Australia is a growing phenomenon which has added to 
the procedural complexity of civil litigation, especially during the pre-trial phase. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions, running 
to 459 pages, is illustrative of the present-day tendency to regulate litigation in the 
finest detail.150 Needless to say, case managers and registrars are also tasked with 
the duty to see to it that the parties comply with relevant practice directions. The 
Western Australian supreme court’s direction on entry for trial bears testimony to 
the policy of detailed regulation and strict compliance with rules.151 The direction 
sets out in great detail all the pre-trial steps that have to be completed and an 
attached “full case evaluation checklist” requires the parties to answer numerous 
detailed questions aimed at establishing if the case is ready for trial.152 Only if the 
case manager is satisfied that all procedural requirements have been fully complied 
with will the case be entered for trial.153 In the authors’ view the entry for trial 
procedure is a hurdle of note that the parties have to clear to gain access to the court. 
It is also illustrative of the importance the courts attach to strict rule compliance by 
the parties in present-day litigation.
3.4.3  Compulsory mediation
The law makers in Australia have taken the idea of alternative dispute resolution, 
especially mediation, as the preferred method of dispute resolution to another level 
by making it compulsory. They have therefore deviated from the voluntary regime 
which is still in place in the United Kingdom.154 All jurisdictions in Australia have 
empowered their courts under their respective case management regimes to refer 
the parties to mediation without their consent and the courts have embraced this 
idea enthusiastically. As a rule, a case will not be listed for trial if the mediation (or 
related alternative dispute resolution) process has not been exhausted.155 Although 
the parties have the option to go to trial if mediation fails to result in a settlement of 
the dispute, mandatory mediation may effectively, due to cost considerations, deny 
a party his or her day in court.156
3.4.4  Court charges
To complete the features of the new civil justice system in Australia brief mention 
should be made of court charges for the issuing of various court processes, such as 
149 See par 3.6 below for further comments on this issue. 
150 See https://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/C/consolidated_practice_directions.aspx (19-01-2019).
151 practice direction 4.4 (n 150).
152 n 150.
153 See practice direction 4.4.1.10 and 4.4.1.12 (n 150).
154 See par 2.2.3 above.
155 See eg Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Direction 4.2.1(8); De Vos and 
Broodryk (n 4) 698-700; Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 224.
156 See Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 227; see par 3.6 below for further comments.
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the originating process. Traditionally these charges were modest and did not impede 
access to the courts. However, there has been a dramatic increase in such costs, 
especially in the case of corporations, but the charges for private litigants have also 
risen significantly.157 The current charges in the supreme court of Western Australia 
provide a good example in this regard. The filing fee for an originating process for a 
private litigant and a small business is $1 318 and for a corporation it is $2 568. The 
same charges are payable when a case is entered for trial.158 In the authors’ opinion 
these charges cannot be described as modest. They rather appear to be exorbitant, 
posing a formidable barrier to effective access to the courts for many potential 
litigants.159
3.5  Synopsis of selected cases 
The ambit of this article does not allow a discussion of all the Australian cases 
dealing with the different features of the new litigation landscape. The article 
focuses instead on a few selected cases which are illustrative of the new approach to 
civil litigation. Attention is specifically given to cases expounding the new theory 
of justice and those that have a bearing on the fundamental rights of the parties.160
3.5.1  The new theory of justice
The decision of the high court of Australia in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v 
Australian National University161 in 2009 has since then been the ultimate authority 
on the new theory of justice and the role of case management in attaining the 
overriding objectives of civil procedure. In the Aon Risk case, which dealt with 
the amendment to a statement of claim, the high court departed from its previous 
decision in Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd162 in which the majority had said:
“Case management is not an end in itself. It is an important and useful aid for ensuring the prompt 
and efficient disposal of litigation. But it ought always to be borne in mind, even in changing times, 
that the ultimate aim of a court is the attainment of justice and no principle of case management can 
be allowed to supplant that aim.”163
Kirby J, who delivered a separate but concurring judgment in the JL Holdings case, 
warned that “a judge who applies case management rules too rigidly may ignore 
the fallible world in which legal disputes arise and in which they must be solved”.164 
In the authors’ opinion the realism demonstrated by Kirby J’s dictum is a valid 
consideration in assessing the role of case management in present-day litigation.
The new theory of justice embraced by the high court in the Aon Risk case may 
be summarised as follows.165 Statements in the JL Holdings case suggesting that 
case management considerations should be given limited weight in deciding an 
157 See Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 297 referring to the court charges in Queensland.
158 See https://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/F/forms_and_fees.aspx (19-1-2019).
159 Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 298 share this opinion saying that “[i]t would be hard to describe the current 
court costs regimes as ‘modest’ and they have become a barrier to reasonable access to courts”.
160 Some of the cases are extracted from De Vos and Broodryk (n 4 and 5).
161 2009 HCA 27; 2009 CLR 175.
162 1997 CLR 146.
163 (n 162) 154.
164 (n 162) 172.
165 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 691-693. There was a majority judgment and separate judgments by 
French CJ and Heydon J, but in essence the judges were unanimous in denouncing the authority of the 
JL Holdings case.
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interlocutory dispute are no longer authoritative.166 In essence, according to the new 
philosophy, a court seized of an interlocutory process is concerned not only with the 
task of dispensing justice between the parties but also, and especially, with the effect 
of any delay in the proceedings upon other litigants waiting to be heard, the proper 
functioning of the court’s processes and the efficient use of the court’s resources, 
which are publicly funded.167 The court noted for good measure that the days when 
the preparation for trial was largely in the hand of the parties “are long gone” and 
added that “the resolution of disputes serves the public as a whole, not merely the 
parties to the proceedings”.168 Bamford and Rankin remark aptly that the court has 
not only expanded the concept of justice, in the sense that it now also incorporates 
the interests of other litigants, but also narrowed the concept for the parties, in that 
justice does not require that they be afforded an unfettered right to present their 
cases.169 In the authors’ view the new philosophy of justice in Australia is clearly 
closely aligned to the theory of proportionate justice in England discussed above.170
The impact of the new theory of justice and the role of case management, as 
espoused in the Aon Risk case, has been huge. The reasoning of the court has 
been embraced and applied with “great vigour in ... hundreds of cases” across 
Australia.171 Fortunately there are some cases in which the courts cautioned that the 
Aon Risk case is not to be applied blindly, without due regard to the facts of each 
case and doing justice between the parties. The case of Cement Australia Pty Ltd v 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),172 which also involved 
the amendment of a statement of claim, is to the point. The full federal court stated 
that “Aon Risk is not a one size fits all case” and added that “statements made in 
cases concerning amendment of pleadings are best understood by reference to the 
circumstances of those cases ...”.173 In similar vein the Victorian supreme court, 
in Namberry Craft Pty Ltd v Watson,174 which also dealt with the amendment of a 
statement of claim, first endorsed the authority of the Aon Risk case but then added:
“This is not to say that the object of doing justice between the parties is to be ignored. In fact, it is 
quite the contrary – a just resolution of proceedings between the parties remains a critically important 
consideration, which will necessarily include as part of that process, a proper opportunity being given 
to the parties to plead and re-plead their respective cases, should that need arise and the circumstances 
are present to warrant the discretion being exercised in favour of the grant of the amendment. The 
principle that a civil trial should be conducted fairly to the parties is beyond controversy. It is a 
human right enshrined in s 24(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006.”175
Despite these laudable judicial comments, the overall state of affairs in Australia 
appears to lean in favour of a faithful adherence to the new theory of justice and a 
strict application of case management rules. The result is that the notion of deciding a 
166 (n 161) par 6 and par 111.
167 (n 161) par 4-5; 93, 95 and 11-112.
168 (n 161) par 113.
169 (n 2) 96.
170 par 2.2.3 above.
171 Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 97.
172 2010 FCAFC 101; see De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 695-697.
173 (n 172) par 51.
174 2011 VSC 136.
175 (n 174) par 37. In another Victorian case also involving an amendment to a statement of claim the 
court endorsed this dictum and followed a similar approach in deciding the issue – see Virginia Surety 
Company Inc v Dumbrell 2011 VSC 602.
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case on its merits and thus doing justice between the parties has, generally speaking, 
been relegated to a subsidiary position in the civil justice system.176
3.5.2 The fundamental rights of the parties.
Most of the cases in Australia involving the fundamental procedural rights of 
the parties have been decided under the human rights regimes of the Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria. A notable case that sets a balanced standard between 
conflicting notions of case management and a fair hearing is Hodgson v Amcor Ltd; 
Amcor Ltd v Barnes (No 3).177 The case is also illustrative of the approach of the 
courts in these two jurisdictions in interpreting statutory provisions regulating civil 
litigation. It is clear that these courts have become mindful of the need to balance 
legislative provisions against the rights enshrined in their human rights instruments.
In the Hodgson case, which dealt with the late delivery of a witness statement, 
Vickery J commenced by sounding a cautionary note regarding the role of case 
management directions:
“[C]ase management orders designed to serve the interests of justice in the course of a trial, particularly 
a long and complex matter such as the present case are not immutable. The procedures set in place for 
the management of the trial must be capable of reasonable adaptation to ensure that the trial is in fact 
conducted in accordance with the interests of justice as the case proceeds to judgment.”178 
The judge proceeded by adding that “it is axiomatic that a just determination 
of a proceeding is the product of a trial, which must be conducted fairly and in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness”.179 Vickery 
J further argued that these principles are supported by the Civil Procedure Act,180 
which has the overarching purpose inter alia “to facilitate the just”181 resolution of 
the issues.182 The judge then emphasised that the act specifically states that nothing 
in it is intended to override the charter of human rights, which provides for a fair 
hearing.183 Procedural fairness, according to Vickery J, “includes the right of a party 
to present relevant evidence in support of its case ...”.184 The judge then summarised 
the legal position by saying that the act calls “for a balance to be applied between the 
case management requirements of achieving an efficient, timely and cost effective 
resolution of the real issues in dispute, and the requirements for a fair hearing to 
achieve a just outcome ....”185 
In the authors’ view Vickery J must be commended for the balanced approach 
he adopted in this case. This judgment illustrates the important role that a statutory 
provision proclaiming the right to a fair trial can play in curbing excessive judicial 
case management.
 There are several other cases decided in the Australian Capital Territory and 
Victoria in which references were made to the fair trial provisions in the respective 
176 See in general Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 92-100.
177 2011 VSC 272; summary extracted from De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 20-21.
178 (n 177) par 27.
179 (n 177) par 28.
180 (n 143).
181 emphasis in the original.
182 (n 177) par 28.
183 (n 127) where charter is cited.
184 (n 177) par 31.
185 (n 177) par 32. In casu the court allowed the witness’s testimony to be presented despite the 
non-compliance with a case management direction to deliver his statement by a certain date. In Vickery 
J’s view the opposing side had sufficient notice of the proposed evidence – see par 33-35. 
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human rights acts, all illustrating the important role accorded to this fundamental 
procedural right in interpreting and applying civil procedural rules.186 In essence, as 
Colbran et al remark aptly, “the right to a fair hearing may operate as a counterbalance 
to traditional or evolving civil procedures, particularly where judicial discretion is 
involved”.187
The jurisdictions in Australia without human rights legislation, such as Western 
Australia, stand in contrast to the human rights regimes of the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria. In general, courts tend to focus on specific procedural 
rules and case law on the subject matter, at the same time giving due consideration 
to the new theory of justice and the dictates of case management. Although the 
common law recognises certain basic principles, like the right to be heard, equality 
and procedural fairness, these fundamental rights are generally not uppermost in 
the minds of judges. The case of Attorney General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond 
Products Pty Ltd (No 2)188 provides a good example in this regard. On appeal one 
of the questions was whether the trial judge’s ruling, which prevented the Attorney 
General of Botswana (AG Botswana) from presenting the evidence of a certain 
witness because the witness statement was delivered late, was correct. In casu the 
witness statement was delivered about four months late but still six weeks before 
the trial and a plausible reason was given for the late delivery. Nevertheless, the 
trial judge rejected AG Botswana’s application to present the evidence, citing the 
objectives embodied in the rules of the supreme court and the importance of case 
management principles acknowledged in the Aon Risk case for concluding that 
the interests of justice did not favour granting the relief sought. This ruling was 
confirmed on appeal.189 
It is notable that no reference was made in this case to AG Botswana’s right 
to a fair trial, including the right to present the party’s case by calling witnesses 
supporting its cause. It is submitted that if Western Australia had a statutory fair 
trial provision like the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria the outcome could 
have been different.190
3.6  Assessment
In the authors’ view there is indeed cause for concern about the current state of 
civil litigation in Australia. The following features of the system call for critical 
attention.
186 See eg Capital Property Projects (Australian Capital Territory) Pty Limited v Australian Capital 
Territory Planning & Land Authority 2008 Australian Capital TerritoryCA 9 par 29 and 38-39; West 
& Anor v State of New South Wales 2007 Australian Capital TerritorySC 43 par 19-20 (this case was 
decided before the Aon Risk case); PQR v Secretary, Department of Justice and Regulation (No 1) 
2017 VSC 513 par 37; Vella v Waybecca Pty Ltd (No 2) 2015 VSC 678 par 152-163; Pham v Ex Parte, 
Drakopoulos 2013 VSCA 43 par 49, 55 and 68-70; Secretary to the Department of Human Services v 
Sanding 2011 VSC 42 par 168-206 (this is not an exhaustive list of cases on the topic).
187 (n 2) 28.
188 2012 WASCA 73; essence of the summary is extracted from De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 21-22.
189 (n 188) par 128-137. See also Moore v Lansdale Pty Ltd 2012 WASC 452 in which the Attorney 
General of Botswana case was cited with approval (par 57) and a similar approach was followed, 
emphasising the importance of case management principles and declining the relief sought – par 51-67. 
In casu the plaintiff sought leave to present evidence of five expert witnesses whose reports were 
delivered out of time and the court refused leave in respect of four of them. The evidence of the fifth 
expert was allowed because the court viewed her report as merely responsive to the defendant’s expert 
evidence – par 66. 
190 De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 22.
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3.6.1 Procedure clearly dominates the scene. The current trend to regulate 
litigation in minute detail has led to a myriad of procedural requirements that must 
be complied with to get a case ready for trial. The case manager’s task is to see to it 
that the parties comply with these requirements. Procedural error or non-compliance 
with a case management direction may result in an arguable cause failing. Therefore, 
a party has no right to present an arguable case for a judicial determination. The 
party is afforded an opportunity to do so but whether that will in fact materialise 
will depend on whether he or she complies strictly with all procedural requirements 
and directions.191 This outcome is of course mostly dependent on judicial discretion. 
Needless to say, the result of the new theory of justice, coupled with a policy of 
strict procedural compliance under case management, is that the idea of dispensing 
substantive justice between the parties has become of secondary importance.
3.6.2 Case management has become an all-important feature of litigation and the 
powers of case managers are constantly expanding. It is not a mere tool aimed at 
ensuring the efficient resolution of civil disputes anymore. It is more like an end in 
itself. The wide powers of case managers and even trial judges to make procedural 
rulings may have an adverse effect on the way a party wishes to plead and present 
its case. The drastic impact of case management powers on the fundamental rights 
of the parties is well illustrated by a recent amendment to the Western Australian 
supreme court rules, which means that a party requires the case manager’s consent 
to call an expert witness.192 In the authors’ opinion this is an unjustified curtailment 
of a party’s right to be heard.
3.6.3 The relentless drive away from trial adjudication to mediation aimed at 
settling cases, which is evident across all Australian jurisdictions, will eventually 
take its toll. It will not only diminish the important constitutional role of the courts in 
the resolution of civil disputes and development of the law but also make a mockery 
of a party’s right to his or her day in court.193
3.6.4 In general, court charges or fees, as illustrated by those in Western Australia, 
have become prohibitively high.194 It is submitted that these charges constitute a 
significant limitation on potential litigants’ right of access to a court. The authors 
fail to see on what basis this limitation could be justified.
3.6.5 A worrying factor in the context of the transformation of the civil litigation 
landscape is that little or no empirical research appears to precede reform measures. 
Bamford and Rankin remark that “reform is largely a judge driven process and 
rule changes are often made without great research ...”.195 They add, with reference 
to the continuous evolvement of judicial case management: “These changes will 
undoubtedly be controversial and they need to be accompanied by rational debate 
based upon sound research. However, the history of the introduction of pre-trial case 
management does not provide grounds for great optimism that this will occur.”196
3.6.6 However, everything is not gloomy. There is at least also reason for some 
optimism. A notable positive development in the field of civil litigation is the 
191 See Aon Risk case (n 161) 2009 HCA 27 par 112.
192 order 36A – see n 143 and 148.
193 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 4) 700-703 and (n 5) 20 and 22-23.
194 See par 2.4.4 above and Bamford and Rankin (n 2) 297-298.
195 (n 2) 13.
196 (n 2) 99-100.
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approach adopted by the courts in the human rights regimes of the Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria. It seems clear that the courts in these jurisdictions 
have become imbued with a human rights culture and that they have embraced the 
notion of applying the fair trial provision in the interpretation and application of 
civil procedural rules. All indications are that Queensland will soon join their ranks 
and hopefully other jurisdictions will follow in due course.197 Only time will tell 
whether these developments will in the future lead to a turning point in Australia.
[to be concluded]
TAXIBESTUURDER JAAG IN DURBAN DEUR ROOI VERKEERSLIG EN RY DRIE 
JONG DOGTERS MORSDOOD – SLEGS ’N VERKEERSOORTREDING EN MOONTLIK 
STRAFBARE MANSLAG WORD ONDERSOEK – WAT VAN DOLUS EVENTUALIS EN 
MOORD?
Op 6 Maart 2019 sterf drie jong dogters op weg na hul skool vir gehoorgestremdes in Durban as ’n 
taxibestuurder op volle vaart deur ’n rooi verkeerslig jaag en tussen die kinders op die sypaadjie 
deurploeg. Na berig word, het die bestuurder weggehardloop van die toneel van die ongeluk, maar 
is later aangekeer. Teen die taxibestuurder word na bewering ongespesifiseerde verkeersoortredings 
ondersoek - wat mag insluit ’n snelheidsoortreding, die verontagsaming van ’n rooi verkeerslig, 
roekelose bestuur, of nalate om hulp op ’n ongelukstoneel aan slagoffers te verleen - én moontlik 
strafbare manslag (Bhengu “Bail for taxi driver who ploughed into teens, killing three” TimesLive in 
Sunday Times (13-03-2019) 1). 
Hoekom nie moord nie? 
Geld vir taxibestuurders in Suid-Afrika, anders as byvoorbeeld in Duitsland (sien 618 hieronder), 
buitengewone en uitsonderlike verkeersreëls wat insluit straffelose verontagsaming van snelheidsperke, 
verkeersligte of stoptekens, die arrogante ry oor geelstroke soos ook op voetgangers se sypaadjies, die 
jaag téén aankomende verkeer en op die teenoorgestelde rybaan? Nog is geen gerapporteerde beslissing 
aantoonbaar waar ’n Suid-Afrikaanse hof ’n oortreder weens gedrag waaruit afgelei moet word dat 
die dader met die erns van sy wandade rekening gehou het en hom daarmee versoen het dat dít die 
dood van onskuldige ander verkeersdeelnemers kan veroorsaak, skuldig bevind het aan moord én 
dienooreenkomstig lewenslange gevangenisstraf opgelê het nie. 
197 See n 112.
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